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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the long-term effects of high school exit exams (HSEEs)
on graduation rates and achievement using an interrupted time series approach.
We find that introducing a HSEE has an overall positive effect on graduation rate
trends, an effect which is heterogeneous over time. In the year of introduction and
the following three years we find a negative impact of HSEE on graduation rates;
this negative impact is short-lived and becomes positive over the long term. We
perform robustness checks using states that do not have HSEEs as control group.
We also estimate a pre-intervention negative effect, suggesting that high schools
start preparing for the HSEE before its actual introduction. We find no effects for
achievement, possibly due to the lack of meaningful cross-state achievement data
in the time period studied.
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1 Introduction
As part of the increasing trend towards school accountability and standards-based edu-
cation over the past two decades, most American states have implemented high school
exit exam (HSEE) policies requiring that all high school students pass a test to gradu-
ate (Reardon, Arshan, Atteberry, and Kurlaender, 2010). Exit exams ideally ensure a
minimum achievement level for high school graduates and raise the value of high school
diplomas, but many scholars worry about the negative effects of such exams on student
motivation, graduation rates, and equity (Dee and Jacob, 2006). Estimation of the real
effects of high school exit exams is difficult because randomized experimental application
of the policy does not exist, so disagreement remains on whether exit exams have positive
effects—increasing the achievement level and degree value of high school graduates—or
negative effects—decreasing graduation rates and fostering inequity. Although discussion
of exit exams’ effects often centers on graduation rates, it remains unclear whether or not
requiring an exam negatively affects the graduation prospects of high school students.
In this paper, we exploit the staggered implementation of HSEEs at the state level
over the period of 1990-2013 to examine their real long-term effects on graduation rates
and achievement and how those effects persist over time. We center each state’s time
line on the year in which high school diplomas were first withheld based on exam scores.
In the linear specification, we find a downward jump in graduation rate in the first year
of withholding that recovers completely within five years. In the non-parametric specifi-
cation, we find a short-term decrease in graduation rates both preceding the application
of the exam and immediately following, but graduation losses are recovered within four
years and continue improving due to the slope of the graduation rate trend increasing
after the HSEE.
Previous findings indicate that the implementation of exam policies increases dropout
rates, especially for minority and low-income students (Bishop and Mane, 2001; Dee and
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Jacob, 2006; Jacob, 2001), although Warren and Edwards (2005) find no effects. The
average effects of educational policies including HSEEs can be misleading as they often
have distributional effects (Jackson and Page, 2013; Ou, 2010). Dee and Jacob (2006)
find that exams reduce the probability of completion overall, but that these effects are
particularly strong for Black students and in urban school districts with high levels of
poverty or minority enrollments. At the same time, they find that HSEEs actually lower
dropout rates in more aﬄuent districts.
For graduation as opposed to dropout rates, the finding of no effects is more prevalent
(Carnoy and Loeb, 2002; Greene and Winters, 2005; Grodsky, Warren, and Kalogrides,
2009; Warren and Edwards, 2005), again with some exceptions (Amrein and Berliner,
2002; Marchant and Paulson, 2005). Establishing causality, however, is difficult and
there have been some methodological shortcomings; work focused on causal analysis finds
a slight increase in dropout rates among black and low-income students with HSEEs (Dee
and Jacob, 2006; Murnane, 2013; Warren, Jenkins, and Kulick, 2006). Overall, there is
some evidence that HSEEs can improve student achievement and the attainment of high
school diplomas, but this effect is highly dependent on school resources and subject to
equity issues.
We begin by introducing the theory surrounding exit exams (Section 2) and previous
findings (Section 3). In Section 4 we describe our data and the staggered implementation
of exit exams in the United States. We demonstrate our methodological approach in
Section 5 and report results in Section 6. We conclude and discuss potential mechanisms
for these effects in Section 7.
2
2 Theoretical Background
The effects of HSEEs on graduation rates can be approached from two distinct theoretical
perspectives: economics of education and sociology of education. From an economic
theory perspective, increasing the difficulty of acquiring any qualification will decrease
the number of individuals achieving that qualification. Importantly, qualifications gain
value as a signal of ability when they are difficult to attain (Arcidiacono, Bayer, and
Hizmo, 2010; Tyler, Murnane, and Willet, 2000; Spence, 1973). From a sociological and
pedagogical point of view, the effects of HSEEs are less clear. Exams could potentially
enhance student achievement by focusing school curriculum and teacher instruction on
the relevant standards, encouraging the provision of targeted assistance for low achievers,
and motivating students (Bishop, 1997; Bishop, Mane, and Bishop, 2001). Conversely,
the exam could demotivate lower-achieving students, incentivize schools and teachers to
give up on “hopeless cases,” and enhance inequity especially among non-English-speaking
students (Booher-Jennings, 2005). If the HSEE is based on flawed standards or fails to
adequately measure standards, all of these issues are compounded.
Economics predicts positive overall effects of HSEEs for the value of a high school
degree and the future prospects of graduates, but acknowledges that these benefits come
at a cost of lower attainment. The predicted benefits of HSEEs are non-negligible for both
graduates and as a tool for school policy. Achievement of a known minimum standard
creates accountability and meaning for a high school education. The increased standards
and achievement raise the value of the diploma as a signal of graduates’ ability, which
improves the labor market and college application prospects of graduates by reducing
informational asymmetries in the labor and college market. At the school policy level,
the HSEE provides a means of measuring school performance, making schools accountable
for teaching the material for which they are responsible (Bishop and Mane, 2001; Reardon,
Arshan, Atteberry, and Kurlaender, 2010). The state can be sure that tested schools will
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work towards achieving the standards on which they are tested.
However, these benefits are inextricable from lower attainment: an HSEE that pre-
vents the lowest achievers from graduating will increase average achievement among high
school graduates by mathematical necessity even if it has no effects on the behavior of
students or schools. Increased standards raise performance, but at least part of this ef-
fect comes from increased selection. HSEEs are an advisable policy from an economics
of education standpoint, but they do prevent the lowest achievers from graduating.
The sociological perspective on HSEEs is more behavioral than incentivist in its
predictions for how schools, teachers, and students will react to the implementation of
an HSEE and is more skeptical of the accuracy of measurement and appropriateness of
standards contained in the exam. As a result, the value of an HSEE and its likely effects
on graduation rates are more complex and unpredictable. Positive outcomes of HSEEs
revolve around their ability to focus school, teacher, and student efforts (Bishop and
Mane, 2001; Bishop, Mane, and Bishop, 2001). Schools and teachers that know students
will be tested on specific material will orient curriculum and instruction around ensuring
that students master that content. Students at risk of failing can be given targeted
assistance, which can include language services for students whose native language is not
English. Students, aware that they will be held responsible for what they learn in class,
may be more motivated to study and retain key concepts.
Alternatively, however, HSEEs can generate negative incentives that undermine
school, teacher, and student behavior. Schools and teachers may take content speci-
ficity too far, yielding curriculum and instruction that covers only what is on the test
without substantive context or meaning. Teachers may decide that some students have
no hope of passing and prioritize them lower than those on the bubble (Booher-Jennings,
2005). Students who believe they cannot pass may be demotivated or incentivized to
drop out. Regardless of the behaviors of schools, teachers, and students, lack of resources
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in some schools and districts might prevent the implementation of necessary changes,
creating a social justice problem (Plunk, Tate, Bierut, and Grucza, 2014). There are
strong theoretical arguments for both positive and negative effects of HSEEs on school,
teacher, and student behavior and performance.
Standards or exams that do not adequately represent or measure appropriate edu-
cational goals are an enormous obstacle to the success of HSEEs from any perspective.
Educational standards are difficult to set, especially given that the purpose of education
is contested in the United States. A successful high school education can be defined as
preparing student for any or all of entering the labor market, attending college, acting as
an informed citizen, and functioning in society. States define curricula for the material
and level of mastery required of their high school graduates, and there is no guarantee
that these standards or the goals they represent are necessary or sufficient for graduates
to succeed in later life. This is further complicated by the potential for HSEEs to fail
to accurately measure achievement of standards. Schools, teachers, and students are in-
centivized to pass the exam, but the skills necessary for that goal may not match the
curriculum standards or relevant skills if the HSEE itself is poorly conceived (Akerlof,
1970; Gibbons and Katz, 1991).
HSEEs focus school, teacher, and student energy on mastery of whatever skills and
material are required to pass. Exams can incentivize schools and teachers to refine cur-
riculum and instruction and to target students who need the most help. Conversely, they
might encourage narrow rote learning and the neglect of students perceived to have no
chance at passing. Students might be motivated to study or discouraged from attempting
a test they believe they cannot pass. All of this can mean a higher-quality graduating
class with more valuable diplomas, but it may come at a cost of lower graduation rates—
especially among students who do not speak English as their first language or who teachers
may be more likely to discount. While exit exams will always need refinement to ensure
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that they adequately measure appropriate standards, the first concern with the tests at a
policy level is equity, for which the first indication would be a significant drop in overall
graduation rates.
3 Previous Findings on Exit Exams
Prior studies of HSEEs have examined their effects on dropout, completion, and grad-
uation rates, with some additional work on their impacts on achievement and student
educational trajectories.
More recent studies of HSEEs and dropout emphasize heterogeneous effects across
student groups and the potential for exams to increase inequity. HSEEs tend to increase
dropout rates, especially in disadvantaged populations (Bishop and Mane, 2001; Dee and
Jacob, 2006; Jacob, 2001). The average effects of educational policies can be misleading
as they often have distributional effects (Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes, 2006). This is
highlighted by Ou (2010), who uses a regression discontinuity design around the margin
of barely failing and passing the New Jersey HSEE to find that while barely failing
students are generally more likely to drop out than barely passing students, the negative
effect is strongest for minority and low-income students. Dee and Jacob (2006) find that
HSEEs reduce the probability of completion overall, but that these effects come from
black students and school districts with high levels of poverty or minority enrollments
in urban areas, while the HSEE actually lowers dropout rates in more aﬄuent districts.
HSEEs have the potential to enhance attainment by focusing instruction and student
effort, but only in the presence of adequate resources. More critically, these potential
positive effects are apparently weaker than the systematic negative effects of poverty and
minority status in American education (Plunk, Tate, Bierut, and Grucza, 2014).
HSEEs themselves can shape the educational trajectories of students. Evidence from
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a study on Turkish data indicates that high-stakes examinations may actually help reduce
achievement gaps based on student background by promoting learning over the course of
multiple re-takings (Frisancho, Krishna, Lychagin, and Yavas, 2013). This supports the
intuition that HSEEs may motivate students and help focus their efforts on mastery of
relevant material, but also highlights the importance of designing an exam that measures
relevant content. Reardon, Arshan, Atteberry, and Kurlaender (2010) examine the impact
of failing an HSEE in 10th grade—with two years remaining to pass before graduation—
and find that barely failing the exam has no effect on students’ academic trajectories,
course taking, or graduation probability except for the very lowest achievers. Those
authors conclude that negative effects of HSEEs on graduation rates come exclusively
from the very lowest achievers. This supports the assertion that HSEEs may have overall
positive effects, preventing from graduation only those students who may not be prepared
to earn a diploma at all. Still, this does not address the equity issues that have been
empirically demonstrated in the racial and socioeconomic distribution of these effects.
When the focus is turned to graduation rather than dropout rates, the finding of no
effects is more prevalent (Carnoy and Loeb, 2002; Greene and Winters, 2005; Grodsky,
Warren, and Kalogrides, 2009; Warren and Edwards, 2005), again with some exceptions
(Amrein and Berliner, 2002; Marchant and Paulson, 2005). The isolation of HSEEs
as the cause of these reported effects, however, is difficult and there have been some
methodological shortcomings; work intended to remedy those issues finds a slight increase
in dropout rates among black and low-income students when HSEEs are in place (Dee
and Jacob, 2006; Murnane, 2013; Warren, Jenkins, and Kulick, 2006). Overall, there is
some evidence that HSEEs can improve student achievement and the attainment of high
school diplomas, but that this is highly dependent on school resources and subject to
major racial and socioeconomic equity issues.
Graduation rates in general have been steadily improving throughout the first decade
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of the 21st century, especially among certain student groups. In a review of the topic,
Murnane (2013) outlines the rise of graduation rates through the 1900s until their stagna-
tion in the last three decades of that century, then their recent improvement. The recent
rise in graduation rates appears to come largely from major increases in high school grad-
uation among black and Hispanic students, an increase that has occurred simultaneously
with the implementation of HSEE policies by a number of states. It remains unclear
why graduation rates initially stagnated or restarted, and significant gaps based on race,
gender, and socioeconomic status still exist. The role of HSEEs in these trends is also
unknown.
The impact of HSEEs on graduation rates remains difficult to determine, especially
in the long term. This is especially difficult because of the lack of controlled experimental
conditions; counterfactual conditions and randomization simply do not exist. Regression
discontinuity designs around the margin of barely passing have been very useful in iden-
tifying the effects of exams for students’ trajectories and graduation probabilities (Dee
and Jacob, 2006; Reardon, Arshan, Atteberry, and Kurlaender, 2010), but overall effects
are difficult to determine. We examine long-term trends in graduation rates surrounding
and following the year in which HSEEs were first used to withhold diplomas. By by
exploiting the temporal variation in state-level implementation of HSEEs, we are able to
at least partially mitigate year- and state-specific trends.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section, we briefly describe our data collection process and present descriptive
statistics. We combine data from multiple sources into a unique data set. The main
source of information is the Center on Education Policy (CEP), which gathers state
reports on high school education and high school examination procedures. From CEP’s
state reports we know whether a given state has an HSEE, when it was first administered
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(or reformed), and how it is structured in terms of grade alignment and content.1
To construct a panel, we complemented the data from CEP with information on high
school graduation rates and achievement scores. We took graduation rates for the pe-
riod 1990-2012 from the Digest of Education Statistics (2012), produced by the National
Center for Educational Statistics (NCES). We completed the NCES graduation rate data
with information from America’s Health Ranking,2 which has prepared annual reports
on health and health dynamics since 1990 that include high school graduation rates for
each state from 1990 to 2013. For achievement, the other outcome of our interest, we rely
on the NCES, which is also responsible for gathering data on the National Assessment of
Educational Progress (NAEP). The NAEP is the most representative long-term assess-
ment of the skills and abilities of American students, and is reported at the state level
in 4th and 8th grades. Assessments are not conducted every year, but still represent the
best source for comparable state-level achievement data; we use 8th grade math scores as
our measure of achievement. NAEP scores are a well-known measure of achievement in
the research community.3 Altogether, the resulting data forms a longitudinal state-level
aggregated data set covering the period 1990-2013. The panel is balanced for the outcome
“graduation rate” but not for the outcome “achievement,” because NAEP scores are not
collected every year.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, shown separately for all states (Panel A) and
only for those that introduced an HSEE (Panel B). For a detailed table with HSEE
introduction years for each state, see appendix Table A.1. Table 1 shows that 56 percent
of states—28 in total—have introduced an HSEE.4 Almost all states that have an HSEE
introduced it between 1990 and 2012, excepting Alabama, New York, and South Carolina.
1We also double-checked our information with that of Dee and Jacob (2006), finding almost no
difference.
2http://www.americashealthrankings.org/
3See Dee, Evans, and Murray (1999)
4We exclude the District of Columbia from our entire analysis.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Panel A. All States (50 States, N = 1, 200)
Year 2001.50 6.93 1990 2013
HSEE 0.56 0.50 0.0 1.0
Graduation Rate 73.89 8.40 48.0 91.6
NAEP Score (8th Grade Math) 277.02 10.30 246.0 301.0
Panel B. States with HSEE (28 States, N = 672)
Year 2001.50 6.93 1990 2013
First HSEE Administered 1999.86 5.53 1990 2012
Graduation Rate 70.24 8.31 48.0 89.7
NAEP Score (th Grade Math) 274.54 10.85 246.0 301.0
Notes: Data collected by the authors.
These three states had an HSEE before 1990,5 but reformed it in the 1990-2012 period. In
our econometric analysis, we consider the reform year as the year of HSEE introduction
for these three states.
Table 1 also presents descriptive statistics for our outcomes of interest. Graduation
rates are a topic of much discussion in the HSEE literature because they are the area
where their effects are most obvious. Most of this literature focuses on individual states
in the short term following the application of an exam; we investigate graduation rates
over the longer term and across all states with HSEEs. The average graduation rate for
all states in the period 1990-2013 is about 74 percent, with a minimum of 48 percent
in South Carolina (in 2003) and a maximum of 91.6 in Vermont (in 1992). The average
graduation rate for the states that introduced an HSEE is almost four percentage points
below the national average, which begs the question of whether their introducing an
HSEE somehow helped the states without an HSEE to catch up; we answer this question
in our robustness checks.
The effects of HSEEs for achievement and the quality of education is a more chal-
lenging question, especially for graduates’ achievement following high school. Part of the
5Alabama introduced an HSEE in 1984, New York in 1878 (Regents examination), and South Carolina
in 1986.
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intended effect of HSEEs on education quality is their ability to focus student, teacher,
and school effort on ensuring students’ knowledge of minimum requirements, so we as-
sume that the implementation of an HSEE would trigger system-wide efforts to increase
attainment. For this reason and to avoid any potential effects of dropout in 12th grade
scores, we use 8th grade NAEP mathematics scores to represent the level of achievement
in each state’s educational system as a whole. We choose mathematics because state
standards are clearest and most nationally consistent on that subject. The national aver-
age NAEP score for 8th grade math is 277, whereas the average for states that introduced
an HSEE is 274.5. Because NAEP scores are not collected annually, we only have 457
observations for this outcome (260 for the sub-sample of states with an HSEE). This
limits the potential significance of our results but does not compromise the integrity of
our analysis as an indication of trends in achievement.
5 Empirical Strategy
State-level time trends in high school graduation rates and achievement are a natural
point of departure for considering the impact of introducing an HSEE on these two
outcomes. Figure 1 and Figure 2 present trends in state-level graduation rates and
eighth grade NAEP math scores from 1990 to 2013. The vertical line visually identifies
the relative point in time when an HSEE was implemented. The trends shown in Figures 1
and 2 suggest that introducing an HSEE may have had some positive effects on graduation
rates and eighth-grade math scores, at least for those states that did introduce one.
However, potential state- or nationwide changes in educational, social, and economic
factors over this period make it difficult to credibly identify causal inferences from these
trends.
To circumvent these concerns, we use an interrupted time series (ITS) approach.
The basic intuition of ITS designs is to use pre-treatment trends in the outcome as a
11
Figure 1: Average Graduation Rate over Time Relative to HSEE Introduction (28 States)
Figure 2: Average Achievement over Time Relative to HSEE Introduction (28 States)
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counterfactual—what the post-treatment trend in the outcome would have been in the
absence of the treatment. Given that this assumption might be overly strong in some
cases—especially if other factors have changed together with the treatment—we perform
a robustness check using states that do not have an HSEE as control group. The ITS
approach has a long tradition in education research,6 and has been used recently to
evaluate several educational reforms such as No Child Left Behind (Dee and Jacob, 2011;
Dee, Jacob, and Schwartz, 2012) and Accelerated Schools (Bloom, Ham, Melton, and
O’Brien, 2001).
In general, we can describe the trend of an outcome Y in state i at time t as:
Yit = f(t− t∗i ) +HSEEit · g(t− t∗i ) + γi + εit (1)
where HSEEit indicates the treatment status of unit i at time t, which in our case is
an indicator of whether the state has an HSEE at time t. Time is measured in both
continuous (t) and relative (t∗i ) metrics. Specifically, t
∗
i denotes the time at which treat-
ment begins in unit i; therefore t∗i is the period such that HSEEit = 1 if t ≥ t∗i and
HSEEit = 0 if t < t
∗
i . Subscript i in in the relative metric of time is necessary because
states introduced their HSEEs at different points in time. This strengthens our causal
claims by filtering out other changes or policies that may have happened concurrently.
The function f describes the trend prior to t∗i , and starting from period t
∗
i the trend in
Yit is described by the function (f + g). Under the assumption that the trend described
by f would have continued after t∗i in the absence of treatment, the effect of HSEEit by
time t ≥ t∗i is given by g(t − t∗i ). Finally, γi represents state fixed effects and εit is an
error term.
In ITS designs, multiple effects exist. First, we can estimate a sharp discontinuity at
the time of intervention—a change in level. Second, we are able to estimate the change
6For an overview, see Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002).
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in the slope of the time-series at the point of intervention—a kink point. Third, we can
estimate a continuous (or discontinuous) effect that does not (or does) decay over time.
Fourth, it is possible to study potential intervention effects that are immediate, delayed,
or even anticipatory. Depending on the functional form we impose on the functions f
and g in Equation 1, we can focus on any effects of interest. Most simply, we might
approximate f and g as linear functions of time as follows:
Yit = β0 + β1 · (t− t∗i ) + β2 ·HSEEit + β3 · (t− t∗i ) ·HSEEit + γi + εit (2)
The model specified in Equation 2 says that the trend in Yit before time t
∗
i is linear
with slope β1. At time t
∗
i , the value of Yit changes by β2, then the trend in Yit after time
t∗i is linear with slope (β1 + β3). The effect of introducing an HSEE by time t ≥ t∗i is
given by β2 + β3 · (t − t∗i ). We can test the null hypothesis that the effect at time t is
zero with the following F -test: β2 + β3 · (t − t∗i ) = 0. In our linear specification, β2 can
be seen as a regression discontinuity estimate of the immediate effect of HSEEit on Yit,
with the difference that in ITS we observe one unit at different points in time whereas in
a regression-discontinuity design we would observe multiple units at one point in time.
Similarly, β3 can be seen as a difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of HSEEit
on Yit, or the difference in the rate of change for the average Yit between treated and
untreated states.
As we explained, Equation 2 allows us to estimate two effects, namely the change in
level and the change in slope at the time of intervention. However, the treatment effect
might decay or reinforce itself over time, and in cases like these our linear specification
would lose the pattern. To allow the effects of the introduction of an HSEE to be a
non-parametric function of time, we specify the following model:
Yit = β0 + β1 · (t− t∗i ) +
J∑
j=0
δj ·Djt + γi + εit (3)
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where is a dummy variable equal to one if (t − t∗i ) = j, and J is the number of years
observed after t∗i (in our case J = 15). In Equation 3, the effect of HSEEit on Yit j
years after the introduction of an HSEE is represented by δj, and we can test the null
hypothesis of no treatment effect at year j by testing H0 : δj = 0.
As we discussed before, another interesting effect that can be seen in in ITS models
is the anticipation effect, or whether the intervention has an effect on the outcome before
it is actually introduced. To find this, we allow the effect of introducing an HSEE to be
a fully non-parametric function of time:
Yit = β0 +
J∑
j=−10
δj ·Djt + γi + εit (4)
where Djt is, again, a dummy variable equal one if (t − t∗i ) = j, and J is the number of
years observed after t∗i (J = 15). In this specification, j can also be negative to estimate
the trend in Yit for each pre-treatment period up to ten years before the introduction of
an HSEE. The non-parametric approach we use in Equation 4 is well known and used
among labor economist, for example in estimating wage losses after job separation.7
In time-series settings, estimating pre-intervention effects non-parametrically also
constitutes an important test for causality. As suggested in the early literature by Granger
(1969, 1988), the availability of many years of data enables testing of whether changes in
a given policy lead or lag the outcome. If the within-state changes in Yit lag—or coincide
with—the within-state intervention, then they are consistent with a causal story in which
causes are followed by their effects. In contrast, if within-state changes in the outcome
lead the within-state changes in the policy, we might normally suspect either policy
endogeneity or the presence of unobserved time-varying state characteristics that drive
the effects. In our setting, however, it is hard to believe that introducing an HSEE had
7See, for example, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993); von Wachter, Song, and Manchester
(2008); Balestra and Backes-Gellner (2012).
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no pre-intervention effects, especially because such a policy follows a lengthy political
discussion involving schools, districts, and the state government. Therefore, we might
expect an effect of the HSEE on graduation rates or even achievement a few years before
its actual introduction. For example, if schools know that an exit exam is going to be
introduced soon, they might modify their current high school curricula in anticipation to
ensure that students are prepared.
In sum, to estimate the effect of introducing an HSEE on graduation rates and
achievement, we use an ITS approach and three different specifications (Equations 2, 3
and 4). We rely on different specifications because we are interested in the many effects
an HSEE might have. While the linear specification (Equation 2) focuses on the changes
in level and slope at the time of intervention, the semi-parametric (Equation 3) and
fully non-parametric (Equation 4) specifications allow the estimation of treatment effects
specific for each year before, during, and after the intervention.
6 Results
This section presents our results in three parts. The first subsection shows the results for
the graduation rate outcome, starting from the linear specification (Equation 2) and then
presenting our semi-parametric (Equation 3) and non-parametric specifications (Equation
4). The second subsection examines the effect of introducing an HSEE on achievement.
In the third subsection, we perform robustness checks to test the internal and external
validity our empirical strategy.
6.1 Effect of HSEE on Graduation Rates
Table 2 presents regression outputs for the linear specification in Equation 2. We estimate
three effects: the trend in graduation rates before the introduction of an HSEE (t− t∗i ),
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Table 2: Effect of HSEE on Graduation Rate, Linear Specification
Variables Graduation Rate
Coefficient Standard Error
[1] [2]
(t− t∗i ) -0.141 (0.118)
HSEE -0.871 (1.129)
(t− t∗i )· HSEE 0.562*** (0.144)
Intercept 68.447*** (0.885)
State Fixed Effects YES
Adjusted 2 0.777
N 672
Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Standard errors
are clustered at the State level and robust to heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation.
the change in level of graduation rates in the year of introduction (HSEE), and the
change in slope after the introduction of an HSEE (the interaction term). Note that
we are estimating a within-state effect for the states that introduced an HSEE, thus the
counterfactual is the state’s pre-intervention trend in graduation rates.8
From Table 2 we infer that there is no particular trend in graduation rates before the
introduction of an HSEE, because the coefficient of (t − t∗i ) is not significant. Similarly,
there is no significant discontinuity at the time of intervention. However, and most
important for our research question, we estimate a positive change in slope for the time-
series at the time of intervention. This kink point is significant at the highest confidence
level (p-value = 0.00), and means that introducing an HSEE has a positive impact on
the trend in graduation rates.
In sum, according to our linear specification, the within-state graduation rate trend
before introducing an HSEE is rather stable, then becomes positive after implementation.
This positive pattern is consistent with previous research on exit exams for industrialized
countries (Bishop, Mane, and Bishop, 2001). However, by specifying a linear function
of time we are assuming that the effect of introducing an HSEE is constant and are
8We consider alternative counterfactuals in subsection 5.3, in which we perform our robustness checks.
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not allowing for heterogeneous effects over time. We might suspect that this assumption
invalid if the immediate effect decays or reinforces over time. Therefore, we also estimated
semi- and non-parametric models.
Table 3 shows the results of the semi-parametric (columns 1-2) and non-parametric
(columns 3-4) specifications. The semi-parametric model assumes a linear trend in grad-
uation rates before HSEE introduction and a distinct effect in each year thereafter. Al-
though we know from Table 2 that the overall trend in graduation rates becomes positive
after introducing an HSEE, the semi-parametric specification reveals that the trend is
initially negative. For the first four years with a new HSEE, within-state graduation
rates decrease by almost three percentage points. This loss is statistically significant and
negative in the first four years, at which point it becomes insignificant.
A similar picture emerges from the non-parametric specification, which estimates
the time-series as a non-parametric function of time with the treatment effect estimated
separately for each year before and after HSEE introduction. In the third column of Table
3, we observe that the significant short-term loss lasts up to three years after introducing
an HSEE and has a magnitude of slightly more than three percentage points per year.
Note that in the non-parametric specification the estimated effects are relative to the
year of introduction.9 In the long term, the effect of introducing an HSEE even becomes
positive and marginally significant, which drives the results in the linear specification.
In the non-parametric specification, we can study not only effects following the intro-
duction of an HSEE but also the potential anticipatory effects. As discussed in Section
4, we might expect states to adjust their curricula before the actual introduction of
an HSEE in order to prepare their students, teachers, and schools for the new HSEE
requirement. Furthermore, major educational policy changes like HSEEs are usually ac-
companied by several years of political and popular discussion and we can easily assume
9Changing the base category (e.g., setting the first year as base category) has no impact on the results.
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Table 3: Effect of HSEE on Graduation Rate, Non-Parametric Specifications
Variables Graduation Rate
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
Error Error
[1] [2] [3] [4]
(t− t∗i ) 0.198* (0.072)
(t∗i − 10) -1.710 (1.145)
(t∗i − 9) -2.020 (1.162)
(t∗i − 8) -2.045 (1.181)
(t∗i − 7) -1.793 (1.246)
(t∗i − 6) -1.433 (1.251)
(t∗i − 5) -1.638 (1.183)
(t∗i − 4) -1.834 (1.289)
(t∗i − 3) -2.551 (1.257)
(t∗i − 2) -3.617* (1.337)
(t∗i − 1) -3.644** (1.087)
(t∗i ) -2.448** (0.663) Base Category
(t∗i + 1) -2.785** (0.774) -3.379** (1.040)
(t∗i + 2) -2.723** (0.937) -3.193** (1.100)
(t∗i + 3) -2.732* (1.084) -3.076* (1.217)
(t∗i + 4) -2.342 (1.276) -2.487 (1.451)
(t∗i + 5) -1.976 (1.235) -1.985 (1.364)
(t∗i + 6) -1.374 (1.410) -1.185 (1.545)
(t∗i + 7) -1.712 (1.520) -1.325 (1.665)
(t∗i + 8) -2.371 (1.655) -1.828 (1.768)
(t∗i + 9) -1.988 (1.814) -1.285 (2.074)
(t∗i + 10) -2.271 (1.623) -1.405 (1.814)
(t∗i + 11) -2.165 (1.770) -1.101 (1.902)
(t∗i + 12) -1.068 (1.978) 0.195 (2.058)
(t∗i + 13) -0.758 (1.847) 0.547 (1.823)
(t∗i + 14) 0.330 (1.248) 1.747 (1.231)
(t∗i + 15) 1.064 (1.302) 2.606 (1.304)
Intercept 70.951*** (0.515) 71.743*** (0.946)
State FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.760 0.749
N 672 672
Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Standard errors are clustered
at the State level and robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
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that students, teachers, and schools were aware of the impending introduction of an exam.
The results in column 3 of Table 3 confirm our expectations, with statistically significant
pre-intervention effects one and two years before HSEE introduction. The presence of
pre-intervention effects, however, might weaken our causal claims because it might ap-
pear that the effects are leading—rather than lagging—the cause. Still, the availability
of many years of data and the fact that stakeholders are aware of HSEEs before their
introduction reinforces our interpretation of the results.
In sum, we find that introducing an HSEE has an overall positive effect on graduation
rates and a positive effect on the slope of the time-series for graduation rates. However,
this effect on graduation rates is heterogeneous over time. In the year of introduction
and for at least the following three years, HSEEs have a negative impact on graduation
rates. This negative impact is short-lived and becomes positive towards the end of our
time span. We also estimate a pre-intervention negative effect one and two years before
HSEE introduction, suggesting that students, teachers, and schools start preparing for
exams even before their actual introduction.
6.2 Effect of HSEE on Achievement
Our second outcome of interest is achievement. The only measure of achievement we
have for all states and for multiple years is the NAEP score. As many other studies do,10
we rely on 8th grade math scores as a measure for achievement. We choose math because
mathematical skills are relatively easier to measure through standardized tests, state
standards for mathematics are most consistent, and the potential for bias is minimized.
Similarly, we choose 8th grade because we want to analyze a grade as close as possible to
high school without introducing the possibility of selection bias from dropout.
We believe that a introducing an HSEE impacts the behavior of students and teachers
10See, for example, Dee and Jacob (2011)
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Table 4: Effect of HSEE on Achievement, Linear Specification
Variables NAEP Scores (8th Grade Math)
Coefficient Standard Error
[1] [2]
(t− t∗i ) 0.912*** (0.159)
HSEE 0.627 (1.009)
(t− t∗i )· HSEE 0.083 (0.180)
Intercept 270.562*** (0.952)
State Fixed Effects YES
Adjusted 2 0.927
N 260
Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Standard errors are
clustered at the State level and robust to heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation.
and the development and application of curriculum not only at the high school level
but throughout a state’s education system. The general trend of education policy in
the United States over the past decades supports this intuition: HSEEs themselves are
part of a broader trend towards streamlining, quantifying, and building accountability
in education. As is especially obvious following the introduction of the Common Core
State Standards, states are attempting to set and assess clear and rigorous standards at
all grade levels.
Table 4 presents regression outputs for the linear specification. The number of ob-
servations is halved because we have an unbalanced panel for the achievement outcome.
The only significant coefficient in Table 4—aside from the intercept—is the linear trend
in time, which is positive and highly significant. Therefore, it appears that introducing
an HSEE has no impact on the (positive) trend in achievement: we estimate neither a
discontinuity nor a kink.
Table 5 shows estimated effects of HSEEs on achievement for the alternative semi-
and non-parametric specifications. Similarly to Table 4, we estimate no particular effect
of introducing an HSEE on achievement. We nevertheless observe a positive trend in our
non-parametric specification—a trend that becomes statistically significant about ten
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years after HSEE introduction. Note that the multitude of non-significant coefficients in
the non-parametric specification is likely due to the relatively small sample size and the
many degrees of freedom we lose estimating all the parameters.
We conclude that introducing an HSEE has no statistically significant impact on the
time-series of achievement. This result holds for the states that introduced an HSEE,
which have lower achievement on average compared to those that never had an HSEE.
In the next subsection we perform the analysis including states that have no HSEE as
part of the control group. This not only constitutes a robustness check for our results,
but also shows whether introducing an HSEE helps to close the achievement gap between
states with HSEEs and states without by raising the level of the states that introduced
HSEEs from much lower than their non-HSEE counterparts to only slightly lower.
6.3 Robustness Checks
In this subsection, we estimate our models for the full set of all states. Doing so allows us
to use states without HSEEs as counterfactuals for those that have one. Including all of
the states in the regressions has two purposes. First, we test the robustness of our results.
If we find completely different effects, it would mean that states with HSEEs are com-
pletely different from those without HSEEs, casting some doubt on the external validity
of our results. However, if the results are in fact consistent with those of the previous
subsections, it would mean that states are rather similar among themselves—at least af-
ter controlling for time-invariant characteristics. This might increase the generalizability
of our results to all states. Second, using states without HSEEs as counterfactuals might
have relevant policy implications. Given that states with HSEEs have lower graduation
rates and lower achievement, we can investigate whether introducing an HSEE helps close
the graduation rate and achievement gaps between states.
Table 6 shows regression outputs for the effect of HSEEs on graduation rate (columns
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Table 5: Effect of HSEE on Achievement, Non-Parametric Specifications
Variables NAEP Scores (8th Grade Math)
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
Error Error
[1] [2] [3] [4]
(t− t∗i ) 0.994*** (0.066)
(t∗i − 10) -9.300* (4.111)
(t∗i − 9) -7.257 (3.720)
(t∗i − 8) -8.502* (3.796)
(t∗i − 7) -5.884 (4.620)
(t∗i − 6) -5.366 (4.034)
(t∗i − 5) -5.266 (3.775)
(t∗i − 4) -0.776 (3.202)
(t∗i − 3) -0.650 (5.150)
(t∗i − 2) -0.874 (3.849)
(t∗i − 1) -2.563 (4.626)
(t∗i ) -0.822 (1.730) Base Category
(t∗i + 1) 0.510 (1.001) -0.198 (5.914)
(t∗i + 2) -1.187 (1.025) 0.321 (4.041)
(t∗i + 3) 2.636* (0.979) 5.981 (3.624)
(t∗i + 4) -0.754 (1.141) 3.465 (3.512)
(t∗i + 5) 1.319 (0.916) 5.169 (4.330)
(t∗i + 6) 0.520 (1.160) 5.577 (4.195)
(t∗i + 7) 1.513 (1.004) 8.463* (3.490)
(t∗i + 8) -0.368 (1.203) 7.050 (3.961)
(t∗i + 9) 0.978 (1.639) 8.611 (4.283)
(t∗i + 10) -0.054 (1.162) 7.836 (4.200)
(t∗i + 11) 0.680 (1.740) 10.809** (3.700)
(t∗i + 12) -1.408 (1.145) 8.402 (4.319)
(t∗i + 13) -0.221 (1.576) 10.004* (3.945)
(t∗i + 14) -1.778 (1.094) 7.412 (4.268)
(t∗i + 15) 0.234 (1.182) 11.218** (4.038)
Intercept 271.185*** (0.412) 272.067*** (3.036)
State FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.927 0.636
N 260 260
Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Standard errors are clustered
at the State level and robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
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Table 6: Effect of HSEE on Graduation Rate and Achievement, All States
Variables Graduation Rate NAEP Scores (8th Grade Math)
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error
[1] [2] [3] [4]
(t− t∗i ) 0.033 (0.045) 0.752*** (0.061)
HSEE -1.946* (0.936) 1.670 (0.903)
(t− t∗i )· HSEE 0.395*** (0.094) 0.234* (0.100)
Intercept 73.335*** (0.296) 269.791*** (0.348)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.799 0.921
N 1,200 457
Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Standard errors are clustered at the State level and robust
to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
1-2) and achievement (columns 3-4). We restrict our analysis to the linear specification
for easy comprehension and because the semi- and non-parametric models—which are
presented in appendix Tables B.1 and B.2—reveal no additional information. First and
foremost, we observe that the effects are very similar to those of the previous tables,
especially in terms of direction. However, we find some differences in terms of significance,
which might be partly due to the increase in sample size.
One relevant finding of Table 6 is that introducing an HSEE appears to help close
both graduation rate and achievement gaps between states with HSEEs and those with-
out. For graduation rates, we estimate a negative and significant discontinuity at the
time of HSEE introduction of about two percentage points. We also estimate a highly
significant change in the slope of the graduation rate time-series. Regarding achievement,
we estimate the same highly significant and positive long-term trend as before. Moreover,
we also find a positive and significant change in slope for those states that introduced
an HSEE after its introduction. HSEEs alone may not cause these increasingly posi-
tive trends in graduation rates and achievement, but some part of the streamlining and
focusing of educational standards that includes HSEEs and policy does cause them.
Overall, we conclude that our results are not sensitive to the control group cho-
sen. Additionally, we find that introducing an HSEE helps reduce the graduation rate
24
and achievement gap between states with HSEEs (usually lower performing) and states
without HSEEs (usually higher performing).
7 Conclusions and Discussion
There are some potential mechanisms behind the improvement in graduation rate trends
and—in some specifications—the similar improvement in achievement growth following
the implementation of an HSEE. The first possibility is improvement in curriculum and
the behavior of schools, teachers, and students. This is the intended effect of HSEEs, and
the increased accountability from the exam could cause such improvements. Second, the
focusing of curriculum, instruction, and student effort could be responding to the perverse
narrowing incentive to only the material covered on the exam. In the case of an HSEE
that perfectly represents and measures the skills and knowledge of a high school diploma,
this would be identical to the first possibility. If there were design or measurement
issues in the exam, however, this would place limitations on the value and effectiveness
of students’ education. In both of these cases, the improvement in graduation rates and
math test achievement we find would be explained by the HSEE successfully modifying
educational behavior towards increased achievement—at least as measured by the exam
itself.
Alternatively, changes in the HSEE such that the exam adapts to a state’s students
rather than the other way around could yield the increase in graduation rates observed in
this study; instead of the HSEE modifying behavior as intended, revisions of the exam due
to political or social pressure may improve students’ likelihood of passing. One possibility
for such an adjustment—one that has been called for and implemented frequently—is an
option for non-native English speakers to take the exam in their native language. HSEE
policies have been accompanied by an outcry against potential discrimination against
immigrant students in many states, and most of those states have added concessions
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for non-English speakers. These concessions increase the passing rate for the groups of
students they target, which would raise the overall passing rate. A second possible ad-
justment would be to simply lower the HSEE’s difficulty level or adjust its format in
response to claims that it was too rigorous or discriminatory. Many states are moving to-
wards end-of-course rather than comprehensive exams, and the content of exams changes
frequently. These changes may also contribute to higher passage rates on average.
Over the long term, HSEEs do not appear to decrease graduation rates, instead
they strengthen improvement trends in graduation rates. More importantly, this increase
in graduation rates is not accompanied by any decrease in achievement—more students
are graduating and meeting the increased standard. Graduation dips in the short term
immediately before, during, and after the year in which exam scores are first used to
withhold diplomas, but recovers soon after and even improves over pre-HSEE trends.
The mechanism is still unclear; while improvements may come from the adjustments
in school, teacher, and student behavior as intended by policymakers, improvements in
graduation rates may also come from narrowing of teaching and learning to exam material
or changes in the exam itself rather than student achievement. Further research on how
HSEEs interact with graduation rates and especially achievement is necessary, but the
first step has been to understand how they affect graduation rates and achievement
overall.
It is true that students at the margin of failing the exam whose graduation year is on
or near the first year of an exit exam policy will have decreased probabilities of graduation,
but these effects are not persistent and are counterbalanced by later improvements in
student attainment. If exams succeed in modifying school, teacher, and student behavior
towards a more focused mastery of the material required to graduate high school, the
exams are useful insofar as they accurately reflect and measure such material. These
findings may help rectify the lack of convergence in the literature towards a standard
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result for HSEEs and graduation rates; the net effect of HSEEs for graduation rates is
positive over the long term, but shorter-term effects can be negative. By estimating both
effects, we rectify some of the disagreement in the literature emerging from differences
in data sources and estimation strategies. The simultaneous effects of raising attainment
by enhancing behavior and improving the signaling value of a high school diploma are
important steps forward for secondary education.
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APPENDIX
A High School Exit Exam per State
Table A.1: List of States with an HSEE and Their Year of First Administration
State Type of Year(s) first Year Diplomas Grade First Grade(s) Exam
Test Administered First Withheld Administered Aligned to
Alabama SB 1984, 1995 1985, 2001 10 11
Alaska SB 2000 2004 10 8 to 10
Arizona SB 1999 2006 10 10
Arkansas EOC 2001, 2010 N/A Algebra 1 Algebra 1
California SB 2001, 2004 2006 10 10, Algebra 1
Florida SB 1998 2003 10 10
Georgia SB 1991 1994 11 9 to 11
Idaho SB 2004 2006 10 10
Indiana SB 1997 2000 10 9
Louisiana SB 2001 2003 10 9 to 12
Maryland EOC 2001 1989, 2009 DOS 10
Massachusetts SB 1998 2003 10 10
Minnesota SB 1996, 2010 2000, 2010 9 to 11 8 to 10
Mississippi EOC 2000, 2007 2006 DOS 9 to 11
Nevada SB 2001 2003 10 9 to 12
New Jersey SB 1991, 2002 2003 11 11
New Mexico MC 2011 2012 11 9 to 12
New York RE 1878, 2000 2003 DOS 9 to 12
N. Carolina EOC 2006 2010 DOS Course-specific
Ohio SB 1990, 2005 1994, 2007 10 10
Oklahoma EOC 2001 2012 DOS HS standards
Oregon SB 2009 2012 3 11
Rhode Island CO 2012 2012 11 9, 10
S. Carolina SB 1986, 2005 2006 9 9
Tennessee EOC 2001 2005 DOS 10
Texas SB 1990, 2003 2005 11 HS standards
Virginia EOC 1998 2004 DOS Course-specific
Washington SB 1999, 2010 2008, 2010 10 10
Notes: Data collected by the authors. SB means standards-based, EOC means end of course, DOS means
depends on subject, RE means Regents examination, and N/A means not available.
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B Additional Robustness Checks
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Table B.1: Effect of HSEE on Graduation Rate (All States), Non-Parametric
Specifications
Variables Graduation Rate
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
Error Error
[1] [2] [3] [4]
(t− t∗i ) 0.121* (0.045)
(t∗i − 10) -1.710 (1.126)
(t∗i − 9) -2.020 (1.143)
(t∗i − 8) -2.045 (1.161)
(t∗i − 7) -1.793 (1.226)
(t∗i − 6) -1.433 (1.231)
(t∗i − 5) -1.638 (1.163)
(t∗i − 4) -1.834 (1.268)
(t∗i − 3) -2.551* (1.237)
(t∗i − 2) -3.617** (1.315)
(t∗i − 1) -3.644** (1.069)
(t∗i ) -2.227** (0.657) Base Category
(t∗i + 1) -2.487** (0.765) -3.379** (1.023)
(t∗i + 2) -2.370** (0.912) -3.193** (1.082)
(t∗i + 3) -2.324* (1.073) -3.076* (1.197)
(t∗i + 4) -1.857 (1.197) -2.487 (1.427)
(t∗i + 5) -1.433 (1.148) -1.985 (1.342)
(t∗i + 6) -0.754 (1.341) -1.185 (1.520)
(t∗i + 7) -1.015 (1.460) -1.325 (1.638)
(t∗i + 8) -1.611 (1.543) -1.828 (1.739)
(t∗i + 9) -1.164 (1.759) -1.285 (2.040)
(t∗i + 10) -1.384 (1.543) -1.405 (1.784)
(t∗i + 11) -1.200 (1.648) -1.101 (1.871)
(t∗i + 12) -0.026 (1.844) 0.195 (2.024)
(t∗i + 13) 0.276 (1.644) 0.547 (1.793)
(t∗i + 14) 1.383 (1.123) 1.747 (1.210)
(t∗i + 15) 2.143 (1.237) 2.606* (1.282)
Intercept 73.554*** (0.267) 74.734*** (0.521)
State FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.790 0.785
N 1,200 1,200
Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Standard errors are clustered
at the State level and robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
34
Table B.2: Effect of HSEE on Achievement (All States), Non-Parametric Speci-
fications
Variables NAEP Scores (8th Grade Math)
Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
Error Error
[1] [2] [3] [4]
(t− t∗i ) 0.841*** (0.055)
(t∗i − 10) -9.300* (3.984)
(t∗i − 9) -7.257* (3.604)
(t∗i − 8) -8.502* (3.678)
(t∗i − 7) -5.884 (4.476)
(t∗i − 6) -5.366 (3.908)
(t∗i − 5) -5.266 (3.658)
(t∗i − 4) -0.776 (3.103)
(t∗i − 3) -0.650 (4.989)
(t∗i − 2) -0.874 (3.729)
(t∗i − 1) -2.563 (4.482)
(t∗i ) -0.625 (2.057) Base Category
(t∗i + 1) 0.735 (1.336) -0.198 (5.730)
(t∗i + 2) -0.538 (1.194) 0.321 (3.915)
(t∗i + 3) 3.577** (1.032) 5.981 (3.512)
(t∗i + 4) 0.348 (1.194) 3.465 (3.403)
(t∗i + 5) 3.325* (1.097) 5.169 (4.195)
(t∗i + 6) 1.748 (1.334) 5.577 (4.065)
(t∗i + 7) 3.018** (1.045) 8.463* (3.381)
(t∗i + 8) 1.233 (1.297) 7.050 (3.838)
(t∗i + 9) 2.565 (1.838) 8.611* (4.150)
(t∗i + 10) 1.582 (1.304) 7.836 (4.069)
(t∗i + 11) 2.696 (1.814) 10.809** (3.585)
(t∗i + 12) 0.525 (1.254) 8.402 (4.185)
(t∗i + 13) 1.752 (1.702) 10.004* (3.822)
(t∗i + 14) -0.016 (1.097) 7.412 (4.135)
(t∗i + 15) 2.294 (1.457) 11.218** (3.912)
Intercept 270.055*** (0.368) 275.612*** (1.673)
State FE YES YES
Adjusted R2 0.914 0.617
N 457 457
Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. Standard errors are clustered
at the State level and robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
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